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HOW DISTINCTIVE SHOULD 
CATHOLIC LAW SCHOOLS BE? 
ROBERT K. VISCHER† 
I was a teenager in the 1980s, and I was raised in evangelical 
Christian circles through which I was encouraged to listen to 
“Christian” rock music, not secular, which sometimes gave rise to 
some casuistic line drawing: 
• Does U2 count as Christian?  Yes, because of that line in 
Sunday Bloody Sunday about the victory Jesus won!1 
• How about Bob Dylan?  Yes, but only during his three-album 
“born again” period!2 
• Amy Grant?  Definitely, but even after she crossed over into 
the secular Top 40?3 
• Does the song need to mention Jesus?  What if it mentions 
Jesus but also has a swear word? 
One of the things that I found refreshing about being 
Catholic is less preoccupation with line drawing, with the “in or 
out” question, at least when it came to matters of cultural 
engagement.  In Catholic circles, I’ve never heard someone justify 
or condemn listening to Bruce Springsteen based on whether he 
can be considered a Catholic singer.  He’s a great singer, and his 
lyrics convey powerful truths about the human condition.  That 
he was raised Catholic has shaped his art, no question,4 but 
isolating what precisely is “Catholic” about him—or how his 
“Catholic-ness” makes him different from all non-Catholic 
artists—would be an odd line of inquiry.  We take him as he is in 
a holistic encounter with his contribution to the true, the good, 
and the beautiful. 
 
 
 
† Dean and Mengler Chair in Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law. 
1 U2, Sunday Bloody Sunday, on WAR (Island Records 1983). 
2 BOB DYLAN, SLOW TRAIN COMING (Columbia Records 1979); BOB DYLAN, 
SAVED (Columbia Records 1980); BOB DYLAN, SHOT OF LOVE (Columbia Records 1981). 
3 See, e.g., AMY GRANT, HEART IN MOTION (A&M Records 1991). 
4 See, e.g., BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, BORN TO RUN (Columbia Records 1975). 
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I’m grateful that John Breen and Lee Strang have taken on 
this project.  This is an important book.  It is a worthy topic that 
does not lend itself to easy answers, and they bring valuable 
insight through their meticulous research and analysis. 
That said, there were a few times reading it when I 
harkened back to my fourteen-year-old self, wondering whether I 
should be listening to the decidedly mediocre Christian metal 
band Stryper rather than the unmistakably non-Christian but 
brilliant Metallica.  At times, the “in or out” line drawing loomed 
large in my reading of Breen and Strang’s text.  Maybe that’s just 
the lens I bring, but I want to explore it a bit. 
It should matter that a law school is Catholic, to be sure.  
But I think Breen and Strang may simultaneously be claiming 
too much and too little.  They may claim too much by seeming to 
suggest that Catholic legal education matters only to the extent 
that it is distinctive.  To cite a few examples of their focus on 
distinctiveness: 
[A]lthough Catholic legal education came into existence and for 
a long time served the needs of underrepresented Catholics and 
other groups excluded by non-Catholic law schools, today, 
Catholic law schools’ rationales, mechanisms, and results are at 
best equivalent to their non-Catholic peers.5 
 
[T]hese reasons—securing additional revenue, enjoying 
institutional prestige, contributing to the public good, and 
promoting academic inquiry—would justify the existence of any 
university-sponsored law school. They do not justify the 
particular existence of a Catholic law school as such. Put 
another way, these rationales would justify the presence of a 
law school as part of a university, but not as a Catholic 
university.6  
 
[I]n establishing legal clinics, Catholic law schools were 
following a trend rather than boldly marking out a space of 
special concern.  They were not leaders in the vanguard of legal 
education, but disciples who jumped on the clinical bandwagon.7  
This last quote—conveying a rather dismissive attitude toward 
Catholic law schools’ embrace of clinical legal education as a case 
of bandwagon jumping—gave me pause.  Would we look skeptically 
 
5 John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal 
Education in the United States 473 (Jan. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the St. John’s Law Review). 
6 Id. at 477. 
7 Id. at 479. 
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at a Christian anti-hunger organization like World Relief because 
UNICEF has similar aims?  Is it all a question of timing, of who’s 
first to the space? 
I do think that we need to be asking questions about why 
Catholic legal education matters.  In the Minnesota law-school 
market, if the Catholic identity of St. Thomas does not render it any 
different from the University of Minnesota or Mitchell-Hamline, 
that’s a problem.  And yet, I think it’s possible to overstate the 
need for distinctiveness.  I wonder if the authors are claiming too 
much on this point. 
At the same time, I wonder if they are also claiming too little 
by putting nearly all the weight on intellectual distinctives: 
We argue that Catholic universities and law schools, and the 
deans and faculty responsible for these schools, can indeed 
justify their existence—that sound reasons exist to support and 
continue Catholic legal education—only if one identifies a body 
of thought capable of explaining and justifying the practice of 
Catholic legal education as an intellectual endeavor.8  
I agree that the intellectual dimension of Catholic legal education 
is crucial, but I do not believe that it captures fully the potential 
distinctiveness of Catholic legal education.   
Consider Pope John Paul II’s admonition in Ex Corde 
Ecclesiae that a Catholic university should be “an authentic 
human community animated by the spirit of Christ.”9  That 
phrase alone can become the impetus for a Catholic law school to 
distinguish itself in terms of: 
• The centrality of relationships (faculty-student research 
projects, responsive teaching, mentoring programs, skills 
coaching, peer support) 
• The integration of a student’s faith commitments with his or 
her professional development 
• Opportunities for community members to engage in moral 
reflection and growth 
• Interprofessional exposure and collaboration10 
• Attention to a narrative of meaning that can help a student 
develop a sense of vocation11 
 
8 Id. at 482–83 (emphasis omitted). 
9 JOHN PAUL II, APOSTOLIC CONSTITUTION EX CORDE ECCLESIAE ¶ 21 (1990). 
10 For example, at St. Thomas Law, our clinical program is a collaboration 
between law, social work, and professional psychology. Ministering to the client’s 
whole person is a manifestation of our Catholic identity. 
11 On these points generally, see, for example, Robert K. Vischer, How Should a 
Law School’s Religious Affiliation Matter in a Difficult Market?, 48 U. TOL. L. REV. 
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I don’t think any of these points of emphasis are captured fully 
by the focus on Catholic legal education’s rationale being a 
distinctive intellectual framework. 
Two more practical questions emerge from Breen and Strang’s 
analysis.  First, what is the role of boundaries in Catholic legal 
education? The authors assert that the Catholic intellectual 
tradition’s anthropology “identifies boundaries to the law school’s 
mission.”12  For example, “A class taught, or an article written by 
a faculty member, or talk given by a dean that directly or 
indirectly affirmed that humans lack free will would not fit this 
anthropology.”13  Because “[t]he Catholic understanding of what 
it means to be a human being is modest enough in scope that it 
permits a wide variety of claims and perspectives on a wide variety 
of legal issues,” the “anthropology would prevent few claims or 
arguments about servitude law currently in circulation,” for 
example.14  
I’m not sure what weight the verb “prevent” is carrying in 
the previous sentence.  Does a need for boundaries suggest that 
there are claims or arguments that should not be made in a 
Catholic law school?  (Note that I’m asking about claims to be 
made in a Catholic law school, not by a Catholic law school, 
which I believe is a different matter.15) 
The pedagogical function of these boundaries is not entirely 
clear.  Breen and Strang explain: 
[W]e are not arguing that a dean or other faculty member would 
not be allowed to say there is no such thing as free will.  Rather, 
the presence of a Catholic anthropology will serve as a 
counterpoint to which materialist/determinist theories should 
respond.  So, a faculty member can say those things, but if he 
does, it would be incumbent upon him to point out that this is 
not in keeping with the mission of the school.16  
Without a doubt, this counterpoint function is important, but it 
strikes me as important in both directions.  In addition to 
benefiting from learning Catholic anthropology as a counterpoint 
 
307 (2017); Jerome M. Organ, From Those to Whom Much Has Been Given, Much is 
Expected: Vocation, Catholic Social Teaching, and the Culture of a Catholic Law 
School, 1 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 361 (2004). 
12 Breen & Strang, supra note 5, at 516. 
13 Id. 
14 Id. at 517.  
15 See, e.g., Robert K. Vischer, Whom Should a Catholic Law School Honor? If 
Confusion Is the Concern, Context Matters, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 243 (2010). 
16 Breen & Strang, supra note 5, at 516 n.143. 
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to materialist/determinist theories, students at a Catholic law 
school would also benefit from having materialist/determinist 
theories presented as a counterpoint to the Catholic anthropology.  
Professors at a Catholic law school should be expected, I would 
think, to present views in opposition to the Catholic tradition in 
order to help students understand themselves as engaged 
participants in a critical dialogue.  By the same token, shouldn’t 
professors at non-Catholic law schools do the same?  What 
precisely makes this commitment to counterpoint-driven 
dialogical teaching distinctive for a Catholic law school? 
Perhaps the distinctiveness derives not from the presentation 
of counterpoints but from the professor’s vouching for the validity 
of particular counterpoints.  In other words, does the Catholic 
law school’s distinctiveness require the professor to put his or her 
thumb on the scale by saying “this is the view that is affirmed by 
our mission”?  If so, is that thumb on the scale intended to 
prevent confusion because it is presumed that students have 
already chosen to align with the tradition, or is the thumb 
intended to have a persuasive function in and of itself? 
For example, when I have taught abortion law, I ask 
students to read thoughtful perspectives on both sides of the 
issue.  I make sure a range of views are presented in their most 
compelling terms.  I do not vouch for or against either side.  Is 
my teaching consistent with my responsibility as a Catholic 
faculty member at a Catholic law school?  If so, shouldn’t that 
same responsibility extend to my work if I were on the faculty at 
the University of Minnesota?  If my approach is not consistent 
with my responsibility as a faculty member at a Catholic law 
school, why isn’t it?  What else should I be saying? 
The second broad question that emerges from my reading of 
Breen and Strang: What is the appropriate role of the market or 
professional relevance in defining Catholic legal education?  I 
have helped create and teach a required law school course 
focused on the Catholic intellectual tradition.  It is no easy feat.  
There is a huge difference between an elective and a required 
course in terms of securing student buy-in.  It is very difficult to 
pull off a required course grounded in the Catholic intellectual 
tradition at a law school today.  In my view, the difficulty stems 
not so much from the contested nature of Catholic truth claims 
but from questions of professional relevance.  Many students 
struggle with the notion that principles emerging from the 
tradition are required elements of their development as lawyers.  
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There is such pressure to maximize return on investment that 
many law students are uncomfortable spending time and tuition 
dollars on courses that may strike them as geared more toward 
questions of good citizenship than effective lawyering. 
Over the years, we have retooled our required course 
repeatedly, gradually focusing less explicitly on Catholic 
intellectual tradition and more on professional competencies, 
reflective moral judgment, and building relationships of trust 
with clients.  I have begun to care less about the breadth and 
depth of their knowledge of Catholic social teaching, for example, 
and more about their comfort engaging in client-centered 
counseling that integrates moral considerations. 
I will illustrate the murkiness of Catholic identity in the 
classroom with one more example.  During orientation week at 
St. Thomas, the first case I teach our new students is Buck v. 
Bell, the Supreme Court case in which Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes proclaimed that “[t]hree generations of imbeciles are 
enough” in upholding forced sterilizations against women deemed 
mentally deficient.17  I also ask our students to read about human 
dignity from a wide variety of perspectives, including Catholic, 
Jewish, Muslim, Buddhist, and several nonreligious philosophies.  
I then return to a discussion of Buck v. Bell through the lenses 
offered by these perspectives.  I do not put my thumb on the scale.  
I try to equip students to express their own moral misgivings 
about the ruling using language that resonates with them, 
regardless of its source. 
There is a smorgasbord aspect to this approach, to be sure.  
My goal is to help students discern and articulate the connections 
between the Supreme Court’s reasoning and the moral 
commitments they are bringing with them into law school. 
Whether or not these conversations are happening at non-
Catholic law schools, it is not a distinctly Catholic conversation.  
In fact, we strengthen the conversation by subsequently asking 
students to read a great article by Harvard Law professor Joseph 
Singer on the need for normative reasoning by lawyers.18  
Professor Singer is not Catholic, and his article makes compelling 
arguments for attorneys to become well-versed in moral reasoning 
without ever invoking the Catholic intellectual tradition. 
 
 
17 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). 
18 Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899 
(2009). 
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If we decided to ask St. Thomas Law students to discuss Buck 
v. Bell in an intellectual framework that was distinctively Catholic, 
what would that look like?  And what would be the value for 
students beyond the value presented by our current approach?  
As the dean of a Catholic law school, I assuredly do not want 
to lose sight of the true, the good, and the beautiful.  Our 
Catholic identity has to be meaningful, and Breen and Strang’s 
exploration of this issue is enormously important to the extent 
that it brings these questions to the surface.  But I want to be 
careful and gracious in my exploration of these questions, and I 
do not want to unduly limit the worthy manifestations of 
Catholic identity to those manifestations that are not exhibited 
by non-Catholic law schools.  Not everything going on in legal 
education should be emulated by Catholic law schools, to be sure, 
but sometimes our commitment to core values will lead us to 
sound more like Metallica, less like Stryper.  And I think that’s 
okay. 
 
